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With	globalisation,	climate	change	governance	has	become	increasingly	international.	
Today,	climate	change	management	is	no	longer	the	exclusive	purview	of	nation‐states,	
as	non‐state	actors	organise	across	national	boundaries,	to	undertake	activities	that	
have	the	potential	to	reduce	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases.	The	extent	to	which	these	
activities	complement	state‐actor	action	is	unclear.	The	question	arises,	then,	of	how	to	
exploit	the	synergies	between	these	two	streams	of	climate	change	mitigation	action,	
while	avoiding	overlaps.	Several	voices	have	suggested	that	the	international	climate	
change	regime	should	play	the	coordinating	role	required	to	align	these	streams	of	
action	–	under	the	assumption	that	non‐state	actor	action	can	be	significant,	and	
additional	to	state‐actor	action.	The	paper	looks	at	these	two	issues	in	particular,	and	
puts	forward	an	alternative	view	on	the	topic.	
	
1. THE	INTERNATIONAL	CLIMATE	CHANGE	REGIME	
The	governance	model	upon	which	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	
Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	was	founded	may	have	become	obsolete,	as	so‐called	non‐
state	actor	(NSA)	actions	continue	to	gain	prominence.	The	extent	to	which	this	may	be	
true,	and	what	the	best	revisions	to	that	governance	model	might	be,	are	key	issues	for	
the	international	community	to	resolve.	
Section	1.1	introduces	non‐state	actor	actions,	a	growing	set	of	initiatives	for	climate	
change	management.	Section	1.2	outlines	the	linkages	between	these	initiatives	and	
state‐actor	actions,	namely	the	activities	conducted	under	the	aegis	of	the	UNFCCC.	
	
1.1	 Greenhouse‐gas	mitigation	actions	outside	of	the	United	Nations	
Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	
Climate	change	management	initiatives	outside	of	the	UNFCCC	are	generally	referred	to	
as	NSA	actions	(UNEP,	2013).	NSA	actions	are	climate	change	mitigation	(and	
adaptation)	actions	led	by	actors	other	than	states	(national	governments),	even	though	
states,	at	various	jurisdictional	levels,	may	take	part	in	them.	
NSA	actions	represent	alternative	governance	schemes	that	complement	and	sometimes	
replace	traditional	schemes	based	on	the	law	enforcement	power	of	nation‐states.	The	
origin	of	such	alternative	governance	schemes	can	be	traced	back	to	the	mid‐1970s,	
with	the	incipient	globalisation	that	followed	the	liberalisation	of	international	financial	
markets.	In	the	area	of	climate	change,	NSA	actions	go	back	at	least	25	years,	with	the	
creation	of	the	Climate	Alliance,	a	coalition	of	sub‐national	governments.	With	its	focus	
on	public‐private	partnerships,	the	2002	World	Summit	on	Sustainable	Development	
spurred	the	creation	of	many	additional	NSA	actions.	They	received	renewed	interest	on	
the	occasion	of	the	2009	and	2014	conferences	of	the	parties	to	the	UNFCCC.1	
NSA	actions	are	reflected	in	the	UNFCCC	through	the	so‐called	Durban	Platform	for	
Enhanced	Action	which,	under	its	‘workstream	2’,	seeks	to	“enhance	ambition	in	the	
pre‐2020	period”	(UNFCCC,	2012).	Negotiations	under	this	workstream	revolve	around,	
among	other	issues,	exploring	the	greenhouse‐gas	emissions	mitigation	potential	of	
non‐UNFCCC	actions	that	help	curb	global	warming	(UNFCCC,	2014).	
A	large	number	of	NSA	actions	were	launched	in	September	2014,	on	the	occasions	of	
the	so‐called	UN	Climate	Summit,	convened	by	the	United	Nations	Secretary‐General.	
Many	more	have	been	initiated	since.2	The	UNFCCC	administers	a	repository	of	
information,	named	the	non‐state	actor	zone	for	climate	action	(NAZCA,	for	short),	
which	highlights	the	number	and	breadth	of	coverage	of	existing	NSA	actions	
(UNFCCC,	2015).	
																																																													
1	This	interest	has	spurred	the	creation	of	initiatives	such	as	the	so‐called	Galvanizing	the	Groundswell	of	
Climate	Actions,	a	series	of	open	dialogues	that	seek	to	promote	effective	and	efficient	NSA	actions.	
2	Concerns	have	been	raised	about	the	danger	of	“overcrowding”	in	some	sectors,	should	the	number	of	
NSA	actions	in	those	sectors	grow	further	(Barnsley	&	Ahn,	2014).	The	same	authors	claim	that	increased	
collaboration	is	needed	in	some	sectors,	with	a	view	to	establishing	synergies	and	preventing	duplication	
of	efforts.	This	would	entail	re‐framing	existing	actions,	to	reflect	global	needs	more	fully	(as	opposed	to	a	
focus	on	the	priorities	of	the	largest	economies).	
Currently,	the	NAZCA	portal	includes	over	12,000	“commitments”	(UNFCCC,	2015).	The	
following	seven	clusters	capture	the	vast	majority	of	the	initiatives	registered	in	the	
NAZCA	portal:	companies	(such	as	the	Carbon	Disclosure	project),	cities	(such	as	the	
C40	Cities	initiative,	or	the	Covenant	of	Mayors),	regions	(such	as	the	States	and	Regions	
Alliance),	economic	sectors	(such	as	the	Cement	Sustainability	Initiative,	the	Global	Fuel	
Economy	Initiative,	or	the	Zero	Routine	Flaring	project),	pollutants	(such	as	the	Global	
Methane	Initiative,	or	the	Climate	and	Clean	Air	Coalition),	forests	(such	as	the	UN‐
REDD	programme),	and	international	transport	(such	as	the	initiatives	convened	by	the	
International	Civil	Aviation	Organization	or	the	International	Maritime	Organization).	
While	reducing	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases	is	a	key	goal	of	most	NSA	actions,	it	is	
often	not	their	only	goal,	or	even	the	main	one	(UNFCCC,	2015).	Notwithstanding,	from	
the	point	of	view	of	climate	change	mitigation,	evaluating	the	merits	of	the	actions	
entails	being	able	to	measure	the	size	of	the	additional	emission	reductions	that	they	
bring	about.	(‘Additional’	here	means	reductions	in	greenhouse‐gas	emissions	that	
would	not	have	occurred	in	the	absence	of	the	action.)	Besides,	cost‐effectiveness	
should	arguably	play	a	role	in	an	evaluation	of	the	success	of	the	action:	for	a	given	
allocation	of	financial	and	human	resources,	did	a	particular	action	achieve	as	much	as	it	
could	have,	in	terms	of	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions?	
Three	main	factors	hamper	such	an	evaluation.	Firstly,	a	great	deal	of	NSA	actions	lack	
quantified	targets	or,	indeed,	even	explicit	targets	(UNFCCC,	2015).	Secondly,	there	
appears	to	be	a	great	deal	of	overlap	between	NSA	actions	and	greenhouse‐gas	
mitigation	efforts	undertaken	under	the	UNFCCC,	which	calls	into	question	the	
additionality	of	the	emission	reductions	achieved	(UNEP,	2015b	;	PBL,	2015).	Thirdly,	
monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	procedures	associated	with	NSA	actions	vary	
widely	among	actions,	and	are	generally	weak,	thus	precluding	any	attempts	at	
quantifying	in	detail	the	impact	of	the	actions	(Norden,	2014).	
A	further	shortcoming	of	NSA	actions	relates	to	issues	of	legitimacy	and	institutional	fit.	
Legitimacy	concerns	ultimately	refer	to	the	extent	to	which	actions	are	both	inclusive	in	
their	membership,	and	accountable	to	members.	Concerns	about	institutional	fit	refer	to	
overlaps	in	goals	(between	two	actions,	or	between	one	action	and	the	UNFCCC’s	
mandate),	and	the	extent	to	which	NSA	actions	serve	well	specified	functional	needs	(as	
opposed	to	responding	to	political	or	commercial	interests).	While	generalisations	are	
not	possible,	an	analysis	based	on	a	sample	of	ICIs	highlights	that	most	are	effective	
from	a	technical	standpoint,	but	score	rather	low	on	a	set	of	indicators	related	to	
legitimacy	and	institutional	fit	(Widerberg	&	Pattberg,	2015).	
International	cooperative	initiatives	(ICIs)	are	a	sub‐set	of	NSA	actions,	characterised	by	
their	scope	(international),	and	the	number	of	participants	(two	or	more).	These	two	
attributes	–	scope	and	number	of	participants	–	suggest	that	ICIs	may	be	able	to	deliver	
larger	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions,	compared	to	other	NSA	actions.	For	this	
reason,	ICIs	have	attracted	the	most	attention	among	both	scholars	and	climate	change	
negotiators.3	
	
1.2	 Governance	issues	around	the	international	climate	change	regime	
While	the	UNFCCC	remains	the	main	governance	structure	aimed	at	curbing	climate	
change,	ICIs	have	emerged	as	a	parallel	governance	mechanism	for	climate	change	
management	(Bulkeley	et	al.,	2014	;	Widerberg	&	Stenson	,2013).	De	facto,	therefore,	
several	climate	change	governance	structures	coexist.	It	has	been	suggested	that	this	
trend	is	likely	to	persist	and	may	spur	more	effective	climate	change	management,	
compared	to	a	single,	all‐encompassing	governance	regime,	which	may	prove	neither	
politically	feasible,	nor	desirable	(Keohane	&	Victor,	2011).	
Many	have	suggested	that	the	UNFCCC	is	well	placed	to	coordinate	ICIs	(Blok	et	
al.,	2012).	For	example,	establishing	‘minimum	standards’	for	ICIs,	with	a	view	to	
ensuring	that	“only	initiatives	with	a	clear	and	verifiable	mitigation	potential	are	
considered”,	has	been	proposed	as	an	immediate	task	for	the	UNFCCC	to	undertake	
(Widerberg	&	Pattberg,	2015).	Further,	it	has	been	suggested	that	a	comprehensive	
framework	should	be	set	up,	to	govern	all	aspects	related	to	ICIs,	notably	issues	related	
to	“benchmarking	and	review	and	follow‐up	procedures	beyond	mere	passive	
registration”	(Chan	et	al.	2015a).	
																																																													
3	ICIs	have	been	promoted	by,	among	others,	private	sector	entities	(for	example,	the	World	Business	
Council	for	Sustainable	Development’s	Action2020	initiative),	non‐governmental	organisations	(for	
example,	the	Climate	Bonds	initiative),	or	a	mix	of	actors.	
Some	analysts	suggest	more	radical	changes	in	the	governance	model	for	climate	
change	management:	they	claim	that	the	UNFCCC	“is	much	better	equipped	to	provide	
rules	for	climate	protection	activities,	and	should	consciously	expand	this	feature	to	
improve	its	impact”,	as	opposed	to	taking	a	more	hands‐on	role	(Hermwille	et	al.,	2015).	
They	advocate	that	the	current	regime	“should	be	complemented	with	another	treaty”	–	
one	that	would	“allow	the	pioneers	of	climate	protection	to	move	ahead	and	enjoy	the	
benefits	of	cooperation”,	while	“the	dynamics	generated	through	such	a	club	approach	
could	be	fed	back	into	the	UNFCCC,	leading	to	increased	ambition	by	others	in	future	
commitment	cycles”	(Hermwille	et	al.,	2015).	
Finally,	it	has	been	suggested	that	ICIs	could	“offer	an	effective	channel	for	public	
climate	finance”	(Norden,	2014).	The	appeal	of	this	proposal	presumably	lies	in	the	
demand‐driven	and	targeted	nature	of	(some	of)	the	initiatives.	Arguably,	the	
accountability	of	the	initiatives	would	have	to	be	improved,	in	some	cases	significantly,	
for	this	proposal	to	enjoy	widespread	acceptance.	In	practice,	to	a	certain	extent	ICIs	
already	serve	as	channels	for	climate	finance.	Notable	examples	are	the	Climate	and	
Clean	Air	Coalition,	or	the	UN‐REDD	Programme.	Therefore,	the	question	is	whether	or	
not	scaling‐up	this	model	would	increase	the	overall	effectiveness	of	the	international	
climate	change	regime.	
	
2.	 A	REVIEW	OF	THE	LITERATURE	ON	THE	EMISSION	REDUCTION	
POTENTIALS	ASSOCIATED	WITH	INTERNATIONAL	COOPERATIVE	
INITIATIVES	
A	number	of	studies	have	reviewed	ICIs,	including	from	the	point	of	view	of	quantifying	
the	emissions	reduction	potential	associated	with	the	initiatives	(Blok	et	al.,	2012	;	
Norden,	2014	;	PBL,	2015	;	UNEP,	2015b).	These	studies	highlight	two	main	issues.	
Firstly,	efforts	by	cities	and	regions,	which	represent	a	relatively	small	subset	of	the	
total	number	of	initiatives,	appear	to	hold	over	one‐third	of	the	overall	emissions	
reduction	potential.	Secondly,	none	of	the	initiatives	has	delivered	a	significant	share	of	
the	emission	reductions	to	which	they	have	committed	(in	the	few	cases	where	those	
reductions	are	quantified).	
Overlap	among	ICIs	appears	to	be	small:	between	0.2	Gt	CO2e	in	2020	(UNEP,	2015b),	
and	0.3	Gt	CO2e	in	2030	(PBL,	2015).	The	extent	to	which	ICIs	overlap	with	emission	
reduction	efforts	under	the	UNFCCC	is	uncertain,	but	believed	to	be	quite	large	
(UNEP,	2015a).	By	one	estimate,	the	overlap	could	represent	1.8	Gt	CO2e	in	2020	and	
3.8	Gt	CO2e	in	2030,	or	roughly	70	percent	of	total	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions	
in	that	year	(PBL,	2015).	The	largest	overlap	is	expected	in	the	clusters	‘companies’	and	
‘cities’,	while	little	or	no	overlap	is	expected	in	the	clusters	‘international	transport’	and	
‘pollutants’	(PBL,	2015).	
The	following	paragraphs	summarise,	by	type,	the	scope	of	selected	initiatives.	Where	
possible,	estimates	of	potential	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions	are	indicated	
(Table	1).	
Companies.	The	top	1,000	companies	in	terms	of	greenhouse‐gas	emissions	account	for	
about	10	Gt	CO2e	annually,	or	20	percent	of	global	greenhouse‐gas	emissions,	with	
almost	a	quarter	of	companies	having	joined	one	or	more	ICIs	(Wouters,	2013).	Among	
the	main	company‐focused	initiatives	are:	the	Business	Environmental	Leadership	
Council	(made	up	of	32	United	States	corporations	adopting	voluntary	emission	
reductions	commitments),	the	WWF	Climate	Savers	(a	programme	providing	advice	to	
28	global	companies),	Caring	for	Climate	(a	United	Nations‐sponsored	initiative	to	raise	
awareness	about	climate	change	among	its	399	corporate	members),	and	the	Carbon	
Disclosure	Project	(an	effort	to	measure	and	report	business	performance	on	climate	
change	on	behalf	of	its	investor	signatories).	By	one	estimate,	based	on	the	data	
available	through	the	Carbon	Disclosure	Project,	implementation	of	the	commitment	by	
a	group	of	companies	accounting	for	about	15	percent	of	all	corporate	emissions	of	
greenhouse	gases	would	result	in	savings	of	about	0.7	Gt	CO2e	in	2020	and	1.3	Gt	CO2e	
in	2030,	compared	to	a	reference	scenario	(PBL,	2015).	Overall,	signatories	of	most	
company	initiatives	seem	to	be	on	track	to	meet	their	commitments	(UNEP,	2015b).	
Cities.	Urban	areas	are	the	source	of	between	71	and	76	percent	of	global,	energy‐
related	greenhouse‐gas	emissions	(Seto	et	al.,	2014).	Among	the	main	urban‐focused	
initiatives	are:	the	carbonn	Climate	Registry	(a	voluntary	reporting	platform	for	use	by	
local	and	subnational	governments),	the	C40	Cities	Initiative	(a	network	of	75	large	
cities	committed	to	implementing	voluntary	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions),	and	
the	Covenant	of	Mayors	(a	network	of	over	5,000	cities	committed	to	implementing	
voluntary	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions).	It	is	estimated	that	the	C40	Cities	
Initiative	could	reduce	emissions	by	0.4	Gt	CO2e	in	2020,	whereas	the	Covenant	of	
Mayors	could	result	in	emission	reductions	worth	0.3	Gt	CO2e	in	2020	(PBL,	2015).	
Since	the	base	year	for	reporting	varies	from	one	signatory	to	another,	even	within	the	
same	initiative,	assessing	progress	toward	the	target	is	challenging	(UNEP,	2015b).	
Regions.	The	Climate	Group,	a	non‐for‐profit	organisation,	convenes	regional	
governments	from	across	the	globe	under	the	aegis	of	the	so‐called	States	and	Regions	
Alliance.	The	Alliance	is	made	up	of	sub‐national	governments	such	as	the	states	of	New	
York	and	California	in	the	United	States,	the	state	of	São	Paulo	in	Brazil,	and	the	
provinces	of	Lombardy	and	Emilia‐Romagna	in	Italy.	Alliance	members	commit	to	“limit	
emissions	to	below	eighty	to	ninety‐five	percent	below	1990	levels,	or	below	two	metric	
tonnes	per	capita,	by	2050”	(TCG,	2015).4	Alliance	members	represent	about	one‐eighth	
of	the	global	economy	and,	partly	because	of	this,	their	commitments,	if	met,	would	
result	in	relatively	large	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions	of	around	0.75	Gt	CO2e	in	
2020	(UNEP,	2015b).	
Economic	sectors.	Among	the	many	initiatives	that	are	relevant	to	quarrying	and	
manufacturing	businesses,	a	few	are	specific	to	certain	branches.	In	terms	of	potential	
emission	reduction	volumes,	the	most	important	are:	the	Cement	Sustainability	
Initiative	(a	voluntary	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions	commitment	by	24	major	
cement	producers,	representing	30	percent	of	the	market),	the	Global	Fuel	Economy	
Initiative	(a	partnership	of	six	international	organisations	offering	outreach,	research,	
and	policy	support	to	developing	country	governments),	the	Zero	Routine	Flaring	
Project	(a	partnership	among	oil	companies,	national	governments,	and	development	
institutions),	and	the	Ultra‐low	CO2	Steelmaking	Initiative	(a	consortium	of	48	European	
steel‐manufacturing	companies,	and	related	organisations,	conducting	research	and	
development	in	a	coordinate	manner).	Full	implementation	of	these	initiatives	would	
result	in	the	following	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions:	0.1	Gt	CO2e	in	2030	
(Cement	Sustainability	Initiative),	0.5	Gt	CO2e	in	2030	(Global	Fuel	Economy	Initiative)	
																																																													
4	Stated	differently,	alliance	members	commit	to	limit	their	emissions	to	a	level	that	is	lower	than	a	
fraction	(eighty	to	ninety‐five	percent)	of	their	respective	emission	levels	in	1990,	or	to	a	level	that	is	
below	two	metric	tonnes	per	capita,	by	2050.	
and	0.1	Gt	CO2e	in	2030	(Zero	Routine	Flaring	Project)	(PBL,	2015).	No	estimate	is	
available	for	the	Ultra‐low	CO2	Steelmaking	Initiative.	
Pollutants.	Some	initiatives	target	specific	pollutants,	irrespective	of	the	emitting	
sources,	because	greenhouse‐gas	mitigation	techniques	are	similar	across	sources.	The	
most	important	are:	the	Global	Methane	Initiative	(a	partnership	of	governments,	
industries,	and	development	finance	institutions	to	promote	methane	recovery	from	
fossil	fuel	production,	transport,	agriculture,	and	waste),	the	Climate	and	Clean	Air	
Coalition	(an	alliance	between	54	national	governments	and	54	non‐governmental	
entities	that	promote	cost	effective	approaches	for	reducing	emissions	of	black	carbon),	
and	the	proposal	for	including	hydrofluorocarbons	(HFCs,	for	short)	in	the	Montreal	
Protocol	of	Substances	that	Deplete	the	Ozone	Layer	(a	proposal	by	some	parties	to	the	
Montreal	Protocol,	by	which	the	use	of	HFCs	as	substitutes	for	chlorofluorocarbons	
would	be	phased	out,	since	HFCs	have	high	global	warming	potentials).	The	Global	
Methane	Initiative	could	result	in	savings	of	1.2	Gt	CO2e	in	2030,	whereas	the	phasing	
out	of	HFCs	by	including	them	in	the	Montreal	Protocol	could	save	some	0.7	Gt	CO2e	in	
2030	(PBL,	2015).	The	Climate	and	Clean	Air	Coalition	does	not	have	any	specific	
emission	reduction	targets.	Besides,	black	carbon	is	not	covered	in	international	climate	
change	negotiations	and,	for	this	reason,	any	emission	reductions	resulting	from	
implementation	of	the	activities	of	the	Climate	and	Clean	Air	Coalition,	while	mitigating	
climate	change,	would	not	count	toward	international	climate	change	mitigation	targets.	
Forests.	In	as	much	as	forests	act	as	sinks	of	carbon	dioxide	emissions,	several	
initiatives	concern	forestry	and	land	use	management.	The	most	important	are:	the	
Bonn	Challenge	(a	platform	bringing	together	several	reforestation	and	afforestation	
efforts,	notably	the	UN‐REDD	programme,	with	the	overall	goal	of	restoring	150	million	
hectares	of	deforested	and	degraded	lands	by	2020),	and	the	New	York	Declaration	of	
Forests	(a	partnership	that	involves	national	governments,	multinational	companies,	
and	civil	society	organisations	seeking	to	halve	natural‐forest	loss	by	2020,	by	changing	
agricultural	practices	that	currently	entail	deforestation).	It	is	estimated	that	the	Bonn	
Challenge	could	save	between	0.2	GtCO2e	and	0.4	GtCO2e	by	2020	(UNEP,	2015b).	Yet,	
current	pledges	only	account	for	39	percent	of	the	overall	goal	(UNEP,	2015b).	The	New	
York	Declaration	of	Forests	could	save	as	much	as	0.7	GtCO2	by	2030	(PBL,	2015).	
International	transport.	In	2012	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases	from	international	
aviation	and	international	shipping	accounted	for	between	three	and	four	percent	of	the	
total	(EP,	2015).	Emission	reduction	efforts	from	international	aviation	and	
international	shipping	are	governed	by	mandatory	energy	efficiency	requirements	put	
forward	by,	respectively,	the	International	Civil	Aviation	Organization,	and	the	
International	Maritime	Organization.	Implementation	of	the	measures	that	each	
organisation	is	currently	advocating	could	result	in	emission	reductions	of	0.3	Gt	CO2e	
by	2030	(for	international	aviation),	and	0.2	Gt	CO2e	by	2030	(for	international	
shipping)	(PBL,	2015).	
The	quantitative	studies	referred	to	in	this	section	conclude	that	the	performance	of	ICIs	
(in	terms	of	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions)	is	limited.	This	conclusion	contrasts	
with	the	main	findings	of	a	further	assessment,	more	qualitative	in	nature,	which	
suggests	that	“most	climate	actions	have	performed	well	in	terms	of	producing	outputs,	
putting	them	on	track	to	implementing	their	commitments	in	the	coming	years”	(Chan	
et	al.,	2015b).5	Echoing	this	discrepancy,	some	authors	argue	for	a	stronger	emphasis	on	
ex‐post	data	collection,	which	can	underpin	a	more	robust	assessment	of	the	
performance	of	the	various	initiatives.	These	authors	conclude	that,	at	present,	such	
assessment	is	not	possible	(Widerberg	&	Stripple,	2016).	
Nonetheless,	a	number	of	recent	studies	have	sought	to	estimate	the	aggregated	impact	
of	a	selection	of	ICIs	(those	deemed	to	hold	the	largest	emissions	reduction	potential).	
Typically,	this	kind	of	analyses	focus	on	selections	of	ten	to	twenty	initiatives.	Most	
studies	report	estimates	in	the	order	of	a	few	hundred	mega	tonnes	of	carbon	dioxide	
equivalents	(UNEP,	2016).	A	recent	study	puts	forward	significantly	higher	estimates:	
between	six	and	eleven	giga	tonnes	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalents	by	2030	(Graichen	et	
al.,	2016).	These	estimates	are	calculated	on	the	assumption	that	all	initiatives	
considered	reach	their	stated	goals,	and	emission	reductions	by	the	initiatives	do	not	
displace	emission	reductions	elsewhere.	For	comparison,	full	implementation	of	all	
UNFCCC	party	commitments	would	amount	to	greenhouse‐gas	emission	savings	of	
between	nine	and	eleven	giga	tonnes	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalents	by	2030	(UNEP,	
2016).	
																																																													
5	A	recent	working	paper	(Graichen	et	al.,	2016),	referred	to	below,	subscribes	this	view.	
Concerted	and	dedicated	efforts	will	be	needed	to	reduce	the	uncertainty	around	these	
estimates.	Three	types	of	efforts	may	be	particularly	warranted:	
‐ Hale	(2016)	postulates	that	“to	the	extent	they	overlap,	nonstate	actions	reinforce,	
implement,	and	give	credibility	to	the	national	pledges”.	To	reap	synergies	more	
fully,	it	would	seem	reasonable	to	expect	that	national	pledges	take	stock	of,	and	
review,	related	ICIs.	A	cross‐comparison	of	this	kind	could	help	generate	additional	
emission	reductions‐potential	data.	
‐ Chan	and	colleagues	(2016)	draw	attention	to	a	particular	type	of	ICIs	–	those	that,	
while	having	limited	short‐term	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reduction	potentials,	may	
be	able	to	offer	large	emission	reductions	in	the	longer	term.	Special	care	must	be	
taken	when	quantifying	the	potential	of	this	kind	of	initiatives,	as	those	estimates	
are	particularly	sensible	to	forecasts	about	uncertain	socio‐economic	
developments.	
‐ Graichen	and	colleagues	(2016)	assess	“good	practice”	in	reporting	by	a	selection	of	
international	cooperative	initiatives,	to	find	that	initiatives	focused	on	forestry	
(such	as	the	Bonn	Challenge,	or	the	New	York	Declaration	on	Forests)	score	highest.	
Clearly,	as	highlighted	in	section	3.2,	guidance	and	performance	standards	will	be	
needed	to	ensure	reliable	measurements	of	(i)	emission	reductions	by	one	
initiative,	and	(ii)	emission	reductions	elsewhere	catalysed	by	the	initiative.	
	
Table	1:	Examples	of	emission	reduction	potential	estimates,	by	sector	
Sample	initiatives	 Estimated	emission	reduction	
potentials	(Gt	CO2e)	
	 2020	 2030	
Companies	
‐ Carbon	disclosure	project	(PBL,	2015)	 0.70	 1.30	
Cities	 	 	
‐ C40	cities	initiative	(PBL,	2015)	 0.40	 	
‐ Covenant	of	Mayors	(PBL,	2015)	 0.30	 	
Regions	
‐ States	and	Regions	Alliance	(UNEP,	 0.75	 	
2015b)	
Economic	sectors	
‐ Cement	Sustainability	Initiative	(PBL,	
2015)	
	 0.10	
‐ Global	Fuel	Economy	Initiative	(PBL,	
2015)	
	 0.5	
‐ Zero	Routine	Flaring	Project	(PBL,	2015)	 	 0.10	
Pollutants	
‐ Global	Methane	Initiative	(PBL,	2015)	 	 1.20	
‐ HFCs	phase‐out	(PBL,	2015)	 	 0.70	
Forests	
‐ Bonn	Challenge	(UNEP,	2015b)	 0.20	–	0.40	 	
‐ New	York	Declaration	of	Forests	(PBL,	
2015)	
	 0.70	
International	Transport	
‐ International	aviation	(PBL,	2015)	 	 0.30	
‐ International	shipping	(PBL,	2015)	 	 0.20	
	
3.	 DISCUSSION	
Even	though	the	literature	on	ICIs	is	relatively	scant,	some	trends	are	beginning	to	
emerge.	They	highlight	the	need	to	improve	(i)	our	understanding	of	ICIs,	and	(ii)	
international	climate	change	governance	mechanisms.	
Great	expectations	are	being	placed	on	the	ability	of	ICIs	to	deliver	significant	
greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions.6	Yet,	for	most	ICIs,	there	is	no	evidence	as	to	the	
level	of	greenhouse‐gas	emissions	reductions,	additional	or	otherwise,	that	the	
initiatives	may	be	able	to	deliver.	Section	2	in	this	paper	goes	some	way	into	
documenting	this	point.	Not	least,	the	literature	consistently	suggests	that,	to	deliver	
more	effectively,	ICIs	have	to	be	coordinated	and	should	meet	certain	‘minimum	
performance	standards’	(Hsu	et	al.,	2016).	
With	regard	to	the	UNFCCC,	most	authors	suggest	that	its	role	has	to	be	revised,	to	
accommodate	the	emergence	of	ICIs.	There	is	no	evidence	to	support	the	claim	that	the	
																																																													
6	Some	authors	even	claim	that	the	initiatives	can	contribute	to	more	effective	review	processes	under	the	
Paris	Agreement	(van	Asselt	2016).	
UNFCCC	may	be	able	to	effectively	promote	the	aforementioned	goals	(Victor,	2016).	
Arguably,	the	UNFCCC	and	its	subsidiary	bodies	are	ill‐equipped	to	serve	hundreds	of	
very	diverse	initiatives,	each	with	its	own	goals	and	governance	mechanisms.	Not	least,	
the	UNFCCC	has	no	legal	relationship	with	the	initiatives,	through	which	it	could	wield	
some	kind	of	influence	on	them.	What	is	more,	establishing	such	relationships	would	
most	likely	undermine	the	initiatives’	reason	d’être	–	flexibility	and	limited	oversight,	
among	others.	
Some	authors	argue	that	the	UNFCCC	should	promote	and	coordinate	the	development	
(and	implementation,	presumably)	of	minimum	performance	standards	for	ICIs	
(Hsu	et	al.,	2016).	It	is	equally	unlikely	that	the	UNFCCC	can	help	promote	‘minimum	
performance	standards’	with	non‐parties,	where	it	is	struggling	to	articulate	
monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	mechanisms	(a	sort	of	‘performance	standards’)	
for	its	own	parties.	
	
3.1	 Potential	elements	of	an	ICI	coordination	mechanism	
This	paper	claims	that	actors	other	than	the	UNFCCC	are	better	placed	to	coordinate	
ICIs,	and	help	develop	‘performance	standards’	for	them.	Having	the	initiatives	do	this	
by	themselves	would	be	one	option,	even	if	it	resulted	in	a	multi‐layered	approach,	
where	some	initiatives	live‐up	to	higher	standards	than	others.	Having	a	third	party	
play	that	role	would	be	a	second	option	(for	example,	the	United	Nations	Environment	
Programme	–	UNEP	–	,	which	manages	the	CIP	database	of	international	cooperative	
initiatives).	
The	UNEP	has	a	long	history	of	acting	as	neutral	broker	to	facilitate	agreement	among	
different	types	of	actors,	as	well	as	in	convening	expert	panels	and	consultative	groups.	
The	Global	Reporting	Initiative	is	a	20	year	old	testimony	to	the	former,	and	the	
Emissions	Gap	Report	represents	a	high‐profile	example	of	the	latter.	
The	UNEP’s	experience	and	expertise	could	be	brought	to	bear	for	the	coordination	of	
international	cooperative	initiative.	This	might	entail	a	mapping	of	current	initiatives,	
building	on	the	CIP	database,	to	identify	overlaps.	It	may	further	entail	the	definition	of	
operation‐	and	performance‐criteria,	to	promote	effective	and	efficient	delivery.7	
Arguably,	such	UNEP‐facilitated	framework	should	aim	at	raising	standards	and	reaping	
synergies,	rather	than	being	all‐encompassing,	in	the	sense	of	including	all	possible	
initiatives.	
	
3.2	 Possible	research	areas	for	the	short‐	and	mid‐terms	
This	paper	claims	that	ICIs	will	only	move	from	hype	to	success	if	they	can	demonstrate	
that	(i)	the	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions	attributable	to	them	are	additional	to	
those	associated	with	emission	reduction	efforts	conducted	under	the	aegis	of	the	
UNFCCC,	and	(ii)	their	actions	support	and	multiply	actions	by	the	UNFCCC.	
Beyond	the	governance	questions	outlined	in	section	3.1,	this	calls	for	monitoring,	
reporting	and	verification	procedures	that	are	not	only	workable	and	scientifically	
sound,	but	also	accepted	by	all	parties.	Specifically,	these	procedures	should	be	able	to	
identify	(and	prevent)	double‐counting	of	emissions,	not	only	between	ICIs	and	national	
emissions	reduction	commitments	under	the	UNFCCC,	but	also	between	different	ICIs	
with	overlapping	scope.	
Effectiveness	constitutes	a	second	key	issue	on	which	additional	research	is	needed:	
from	an	effectiveness	point	of	view,	decisions	concerning	the	allocation	of	resources	
should	in	principle	prioritise	the	initiatives	that	deliver	larger	emission	reductions.	Such	
normative	view	clashes	with	two	realities.	Firstly,	while	some	ICIs	deliver	greenhouse‐
gas	emission	reductions,	climate	change	mitigation	is	not	their	primary	purpose.	For	
these	initiatives,	emissions‐reduction	criteria	are	unlikely	to	drive	resource	allocation	
decisions.	Secondly,	public	relations,	rather	than	climate	change	mitigation,	is	arguably	
the	true	motivation	behind	several	initiatives	that	have	greenhouse‐gas	emission	
reductions	as	their	stated	goal	(this	is	notably	the	case	for	initiatives	that	lack	any	kind	
of	specific	targets).	For	these	initiatives,	effectiveness	considerations	are	secondary	to	
their	primary	public	relations	rationale.	
																																																													
7	The	latter	would	most	likely	touch	upon	the	types	and	frequency	of	reporting	that	are	relevant	to	each	
sector.	
The	literature	puts	forward	a	number	of	criteria	for	assessing	the	effectiveness	of	ICIs	–	
those	that	have	climate	change	mitigation	as	their	true	primary	goal.	The	proposals	by	
Harrison	et	al.	(2015)	are	among	the	most	comprehensive.	It	is	understood	that	
performance	with	regard	to	greenhouse‐gas	emission	reductions	would	add	to	these	
two	elements.	
Further	work	is	needed	to	capture	the	full	complexity	of	the	initiatives.	Specifically,	
effectiveness	criteria	need	to	reflect	issues	such	as	the	adequacy	of	the	initiatives’	stated	
goals	and	time	tables,	or	the	stringency	of	the	accountability	mechanism	considered.	
Time	frames	constitute	a	further	element	that	requires	research:	for	a	given	budget,	the	
pace	at	which	emissions	can	be	reduced	varies	across	gases,	sectors	and	world	regions	–	
a	consideration	that	effectiveness	criteria	should	reflect.	
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